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Professor Geoffrey Hazard has accurately captured the "Futures
Problem." Not only has he succinctly stated the problem, but he also
has hit the perfect pitch of pessimism entailed in this subject. It is
abundantly clear that neither the judicial system nor the legislature
will ever solve the problems of mass tort litigation until we find a way
to resolve the futures problem!
Professor Hazard has usefully distilled several conclusions from his
knowledge of mass tort litigation, settlements, legislation, and
rulemaking efforts. First, not all mass tort cases are alike.2 Second,
only latent-injury mass torts involve the futures problem. Third,
medical monitoring is only a partial, and not especially efficacious,
means for dealing with future claimants.4  Fourth, substantive,
procedural, and technical difficulties limit the effectiveness of
proposed bankruptcy solutions.5 Fifth, Congress is an immovable
object paralyzed by interest-group gridlock and is therefore incapable
of legislating to resolve the futures problem.6 Sixth, in light of the
t Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor, University of Texas Law School. B.A.
1971, City College of New York; M. Phil. 1974, Ph.D. 1977, Columbia University;J.D.
1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
' The problem of future claimants is given relatively short-shrift in the 1999
monumental Report on Mass Tort Litigation. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RuLEs &
WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, REPORT ON MAss TORT LITGATION 34-35, 58 (1999)
[hereinafter REPORT ON MASS TORT LrIMGATION] (discussing the problems associated
with future claimants); see also i& app. F-1 at 2 (same); id app. F-4 § 2.1.2 ("Protecting
the Interests of Holders of Mass Future Claims"); id. § 2.1.3 ("Determination of Mass
Future Claims"); i&. app. F-6 ("Future Mass Tort Claimants").
2 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1902-03
(2000) (describing different types of mass torts).
s See id. at 1903 (noting that the futures problem only relates to toxic mass torts).
4 See id. at 1905-06 (discussing the limitations of medical monitoring).
5 See id. at 1908-10 (discussing problems with a bankruptcy solution).
6 See id. at 1916 (noting the influence of interest groups on Congress).
(1919)
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Supreme Court's 1999 Ortiz decision, 7 the limited fund concept is
moribund for resolving future claims.8 Seventh, class actions may
compromise Seventh Amendment rights.9 And last, the class action is
dead.'
If this were not grim enough, the country's senior-ranking and
highly eminent proceduralist ends his paper with a four-paragraph
substantive solution to the futures problem." Clearly, we are in trouble.
I join Professor Hazard in his dour pessimism. He correctly and
poignantly describes the consequences for asbestos claimants of the
Supreme Court's repudiation of the Anmhem1 2 and Ortiz settlements.
Although the Court's rejection of these settlements vindicates due
process, it also delays, denies, or devalues justice for thousands of
genuinely injured claimants, a practical consequence that largely has
13been overlooked in the commentary on these decisions.
I part company with Professor Hazard's gloom, however, in two
respects. Although a consequence of the Amchem and Ortiz decisions
may be a decline in the volume of class litigation14  a proposition I
7 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
" See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1910 (noting the Court's disapproval of the "limited
fund" concept).
9 See id. at 1914 (noting the potential Seventh Amendment right to jury trial issues
inherent in some mass tort litigation).
'o See id. at 1915 ("Perhaps Ortiz thus has ended class suits of all kinds ...
n See id. at 1917-18.
12 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
Is See Linda S. Mullenix, Court Nixes Latest Settlement Class, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1999,
at B12 [hereinafter Mullenix, Court Nixes Latest Settlement Class] (discussing the impact
of the Ortiz and Amchem decisions on efforts to afford justice to injured claimants);
Linda S. Mullenix, Court Settles Settlement Class Issue, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B12
(noting that the resolution of asbestos claims is "back to square one in the judicial
system").
4 The vitality and volume of class action litigation runs in cycles, often in reaction
to court decisions. Thus, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 inspired an increase in class
action litigation in the ensuing decade. However, three Supreme Court decisions in
the early 1970s slowed the volume of class litigation by imposing various requirements
on class plaintiffs regarding the financing of notice costs and limiting the ability to
aggregate damages to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974) (requiring plaintiffs to pay costs of
notice); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (prohibiting the
aggregation of damages for purposes of meeting the amount in controversy
requirement); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338-42 (1969) (same). After 1983, with
the amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (providing for sanctions against
lawyers litigating spurious claims), Rule 11 sanctions were effectively deployed in some
federal courts to discourage plaintiffs' attorneys from pursuing certain types of civil
rights class action litigation. See generally Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation,
37 BuFF. L. REv. 485, 487 (1988-1989). See also id (discussing how implementation of
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doubt 5-- class action litigation is far from dead.
As I have written elsewhere, I do not agree that the Ortiz decision
effectively killed off the limited-fund class as a means for resolving
mass torts or future claims.16 I do not read Ortiz as flatly prohibiting
limited fund class actions or certification of limited fund classes in
mass tort litigation. In the future, attorneys will parse the Ortiz
decision carefully, making every attempt to "prove up" the existence of
the limited fund within the parameters Justice Souter believes the rule
requires.
Nor do I read Ortiz so narrowly as to repudiate mandatory
injunctive classes, a sweeping proposition so untenable that it seems
.17incredible If Professor Hazard is correct, then what are we to make
of the entire realm of public law litigation, which is built on the
mandatory structural injunction?
18
Rule 11's amendments "has disadvantaged civil rights litigants and attorneys during the
initial half-decade of experience"). A series of federal appellate decisions in 1995-1996
effectively discouraged plaintiffs' tort lawyers from pursuing nationwide mass tort class
actions in the federal courts. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
740-45 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the impropriety of a class certification); In re
American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295-1302 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). Consequently,
plaintiffs' tort lawyers pursued the Amchem and Ortiz litigation in state courts.
It remains to be seen whether the Court's Amcher and Ortiz decisions will have the
same effect on settlement classes as did the Eisen and Zahn decisions in the early 1970s.
" The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995), and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998), were intended to reduce the abuses of securities
and derivative litigation by tightening the substantive and procedural requirements for
this litigation (including class actions). Notwithstanding these statutes' heightened
requirements, the volume of securities and derivative actions seems not to have abated
significantly. See David Priebe, Piling On: The Reemergence of the Parallel Derivative Lawsuit
as the Federal Securities Class Action Window Closes, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1999, at 333,
335 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1136, 1999) (discussing
the emergence of parallel derivative suits in the place of federal securities class
actions); Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements After
Two and a Half Years: Has It Changed the Law? Has It Achieved What Congress Intended?, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 645 (1998) (arguing that the legislation has failed to "foster more
forward-looking disclosure by issuers").
16 See Mullenix, Court Nixes Latest Settlement Class, supra note 13 (discussing the
impact that the Ortiz decision had on creating a new structure for limited-fund class
actions).
17 See Hazard, supra note 2, Part V (suggesting that the reasoning in Ortiz would
severely limit the availability of an injunctive class suit).
'8 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1292-96 (1976) (describing the injunctive class as the key remedial feature of
public interest litigation). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort
Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm 33 VAL U. L. REV. 413, 424
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I do agree that the originalist view on Rule 23 expressed by Justice
Souter will have a limiting, if not crippling, effect on class actions. We
are entering a new era of class litigation that will be profoundly
informed and shaped by the Amchem and Ortiz decisions. We cannot
predict, however, the ultimate impact of these opinions based only on
the current enthusiasm for class action litigation.
I. THE FUTURES PROBLEM AND THE COURTS
The futures problem is very much with us.19 As Professor Hazard
accurately recognizes, the judicial system deals fairly well, if
imperfectly, in resolving mass accident cases of the airplane
crash/train-wreck variety.0 Latent-injury mass torts, however, are
more difficult to resolve because defendants and their insurers are
unwilling to negotiate any deal that does not include future claims.
Resolving future claims, then, is the ticket to the settlement table and
what the defense lawyers call "global peace.'i'
As we have learned, plaintiffs' lawyers are quite willing to punch
the futures ticket and negotiate with defendants and their insurers to
resolve future claims in latent injury mass torts.2 Hence, plaintiff and
(1999) (rejecting applicability of public interest paradigm to mass tort litigation).
'9 See generallyJohn W. Ames et al., Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcy Cases, 13
AM. BANKiR INST. J. 8 (1994) (discussing the difficulty courts face when dealing with
futures claims); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims:
The Unfinished Business Left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANER. LJ. 487, 497
(1995) (indicating the uncertainty surrounding futures claims in bankruptcy); Alex
Raskolnikov, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor?, 107YALE L.J. 2545, 2581 (1998) (offering a solution to the future claimants
problem); Note, And Justiciability for All?: Future Injury Plaintiffs and the Separation of
Powers, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1066, 1076-82 (1996) (offering a framework for fitting future
injury cases within the Article III standing requirement);Jeremy Gaston, Note, Standing
on Its Head: The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 TEX. L. REV.
215, 217 (1998) (defending a "bright line denial of standing" to future claimants);
Daniel M. Weddle, Note, Settlement Class Actions and "Mere-Exposure" Future Claimants:
Problems in Mass Toxic Tort Liability, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 113, 115-26 (1998) (discussing the
difficulties with future claims litigation).
2See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1904 (noting that the issues raised by mass torts of the
airplane crash sort are similar to those dealt with by courts in many types of modem
litigation).
21 See REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 35 ("The mirror image of
these questions arises from the desire of defendants to achieve closure---to buy 'global
peace'-by resolving all present and future claims at once.").
Indeed, the willingness of the plaintiffs' lawyers to negotiate the fate of the future
claimants sets the stage for both the Amchem and the Ortiz deals. For a brief history of
the negotiations leading to these settlements, see generally Linda S. Mullenix, Asbestos
at the Crossroads: Will a Mandatory Class Pass Muster, 1998 Term PREVEW U.S. SUP. Cr.
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defense lawyers, aided and abetted by adventuresome judgest s have
creatively exploited various techniques to solve the futures problem.
This endeavor has leaned heavily on metaphor, simile, and
analogy. Thus, courts have found a future-claims fund to be similar to
a res,'2 4 a limited find,t an action in interpleader, 26 or a bankruptcy. s
The signature theme of Justice Souter's O7tiz opinion is the direction
to stop all this inventiveness. 28  As a result, courts have emphatically
said that plaintiffs with current claims cannot negotiate for future
claimants, or do so only at the peril of being charged with collusion,
conflict of interest, inadequacy, and self-dealing.29
CAS. 118 (1998) (focusing on Ortiz); Linda S. Mullenix, Settlement Class at Issue in the
'Ortiz' Appea4 NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1998, at B10 (same); Linda S. Mullenix, Must
Settlement Classes Satisfy All the Requirements of Litigation Classes?, 1996 Term PREVIE U.S.
Sup. Cr. GAs. 296 (1997) (focusing on Amchem).
2 See, e.g., In reAsbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding limited-
fund class settlement of asbestos future claims), rev'd Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721,
745 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the insolvency of Manville Trust rendered it a limited
fund and qualified it for treatmentunder Rule 23(b) (1) (B)).
24 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
("Several courts have considered class action litigation analogous to in ren actions given
their magnitude and complexity. In Baldwin-United the class action proceeding was 'so
far advanced that it was the virtual equivalent of a res over which the district judge
required full control.'" (citation omitted)).
2 See id. at 38; see also In reAsbestos Litig., 90 F.3d at 968.
26 See, e.g., In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. at 38 ("Limited fund class
actions closely resemble an interpleader action.").
27 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d at 984 ("The plain meaning of Rule 23 also
supports a finding that the insolvency of a defendant can support a [Rule] 23(b) (1) (B)
class action.").
See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314 ("Finally, if we needed further counsel against
adventurous application of Rule 23(b) (1) (B), the Rules Enabling Act and the general
doctrine of constitutional avoidance would jointly sound a warning of the serious
constitutional concerns that come with any attempt to aggregate individual tort claims
on a limited fund rationale.").
See Oti/z, 119 S. Ct. at 2318-20 (describing the impropriety of certifying a class
with both present and future claimants); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 625-28 (1997) (noting that the differences between the currently injured and
exposure-only plaintiffs prevented certification of a single class). There is a substantial
literature discussing the ethical implications of settlement classes that involve
simultaneous negotiation of present and future claimants. See generally Symposium,
Mass Tortes: Sering Upjust Desserts, 80 CORNELLL. REV. 811 (1995).
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II. PROFESSOR HAZARD'S PROPOSAL To DEAL
WITH THE FUTURES PROBLEM
Where does this leave us and what is to be done?3°
To deal with the futures problem, Professor Hazard would jettison
all past attempts at inventiveness under Rule 23 or the Bankruptcy
Code. Instead he proposes to federalize products liability law,
underwritten by insurance, with relief administered by state workers'
compensation systems.31 This proposal combines federalization and
the modem administrative state with a dab of private enterprise for
good measure. This proposal also suggests that, notwithstanding our
President's pronouncements, the era of big government is perhaps not
over yet.
With all due respect, and understanding very well the complexity
of the futures problem, Professor Hazard's proposal nonetheless
embodies another Rube-Goldberg-like contraption that cobbles
together various schemes that individually make sense. It kind of
sounds good. He has, of course, neglected to tell us why this proposal
would appeal to Congress, as opposed to all other failed attempts to
federalize products liability law.3
2
Because I agree with Professor Hazard that prior attempts at
dealing with the futures problems have been ineffectual-if not
illegal-I propose an alternative idea to privatize effectively the
resolution of future claims.
'o The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United
States apparently has chosen to do nothing about the futures problem, at least in the
short run. Thus, the conclusion of the Working Group on Mass Tort Litigation
included the following:
Even greater difficulties are presented by the issue of certifying a class of
plaintiffs who will experience injury only in the future. Although the Advisory
Committee has held resolution of these problems in abeyance, it is likely that
realistic, workable answers will be found only through a combination of
legislation and implementing procedural rules.
REPORT ON MASS TORT LIGATIoN, supra note 1, at 58.
s See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1917 (proposing a solution to the futures problem).
32 See Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts & Proposals: A Report to the Mass Torts Working
Group, in REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 1, app. C at 21 ("Congress has
been reluctant to federalize products liability laws because they have traditionally been
within the province of the States.").
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III. PRIVATIZING FUTURE CLAIMS
A. Framing the PracticalProblems
The idea to privatize the resolution of future claims is derived
from a few propositions that frame the practical problems involved in
these claims. These include the necessities to: (1) resolve future
claims as a part of any latent injury mass tort settlement; (2) sever
future claims from current claims resolution; (3) estimate future
claims accurately; and (4) create an independent entity to process
future claims. As I will discuss below, 3 these practical problems can be
addressed by utilizing current procedural mechanisms coupled with
economic incentives.
First, defendants will not settle a latent injury mass tort litigation
unless the deal includes some disposition of future claims.34 If latent
injury mass torts are to be settled or resolved under judicial
auspices-or through legislative initiative, for that matter-the
resolution must include some disposition of future claims.
Second, the resolution of future claims must be accomplished
separately from the resolution of current or "inventory" claims.
Hence, plaintiffs' attorneys cannot be involved in simultaneous
negotiations for the resolution of current and future claims. If a latent
injury mass tort involves future claims, that fact must be identified
early in the litigation and the future claims should be severed from the
litigation to avoid any possibility of conflicts of interest, sell-outs, or
taint of collusion.
Third, some entity other than the parties, their attorneys, and
their experts should be responsible for determining the number of
future claimants. If we have learned anything from three decades of
mass tort litigation, it is that the actors involved in latent injury mass
torts have proven to be notoriously bad at estimating the universe of
future claimants.35
-" See infra Part I1I.C (discussing the implementation of private future claims
processing).
See supra text accompanying notes 1 & 21 (discussing the importance of the
future claims problem).
5 Most famously, the Manville Personal Injury Trust greatly underestimated the
number of asbestos future claimants who subsequently would make claims against the
Trust, a fact that led to the dismissal of the Trustees and a reorganization of the Trust
under new court supervision. See Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future 17 CARDOzO L. REv. 583, 622 (1996) (indicating
that in 1986, the initial estimate of future claimants against the Trust were between
83,000 and 100,000 claims, but that within a decade, the Trust projected more than
20001 1925
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The miscalculation of the numbers of future claimants has a
cascade effect because the underestimation of future claims will
quickly exhaust a settlement fund to the detriment of other future
claimants. Thus, any system for dealing with future claims must
include some mechanism for inducing the most accurate estimate of
the universe of future claimants.
There are several reasons why the current system results in the
miscalculation of the number of futures claims. The actors involved in
mass tort settlements-including the judges who must approve the
fairness of those settlements-have few incentives to determine
accurately the estimates of future claims. Such estimates typically are
provided through expert testimony. The major motivation for
providing a reasonably plausible estimate of future claims is to induce
the court's approval of the settlement. However, hardly anyone
involved in a mass tort settlement (other than an objector or a
guardian ad litem for future claimants) has a great incentive to
challenge the estimate.36
After the court approves a settlement, if the money runs out,
neither the parties nor the court especially cares about the future
claimants. The defendants contribute to a fund to be administered by
a claims facility; the plaintiffs' attorneys take their fees and have little
hands-on management of the settlement fund; and the court largely is
out of the picture. A miscalculation of future claims becomes the
problem of the claims administrators or fund trustees.
Fourth, any resolution of future claims must involve a professional
administrative claims facility. Plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and the
judiciary do not want to administer claims, nor do any of these actors
have the expertise to do so. Professional commercial entities should
process future claims and, with proper economic incentives, future
claims resolution should bring into existence such entities.
500,000 claims).
Objectors may or may not have a great incentive to challenge the parties'
estimates of future claimants. Moreover, to assert this type of challenge, the objector
would have to retain an independent expert witness to perform the actuarial studies to
provide another estimate. In theory, a court-appointed guardian ad liten has the
greatest incentive (if not a fiduciary duty) to determine independently an accurate
estimate of future claims. Performance of this task, however, assumes that the court, in
appointing the guardian, provides resources sufficient to allow the guardian to hire an
independent expert witness to future claims--an assumption that may have no basis in
fact.
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B. Framing the Legal Problems
Apart from practical problems, the resolution of future claims
entails an array of legal issues, many of constitutional dimension.
These include: (1) defining a future claimant, (2) standing,
(3) statute of limitations, (4) notice, and (5) consent 7  Indeed,
Professor Hazard's despair about future claims arises chiefly from his
contemplation of these issues.
The first two problems-defining the future claimant and
standing-are related. Objectors in latent injury mass tort cases have
argued that future claimants have no actual injury and therefore can
have no standings an Article III "case and controversy" objection 9 In
this version, the future claimant is a phantasmagoric figment of the
imagination for whom no one can provide remediation. More starkly,
according to this view, the future claimant is an oxymoron: the future
claimant is no claimant. Any resolution of the future claims problem,
then, must resolve this conundrum by acknowledging the existence
and legal force of future claims.40
Future claimants also run afoul of limitations problems because of
the intrinsic nature of latent injury. Of all the problems implicated in
the resolution of future claims, limitations problems seem the easiest
to rectify, either by party consent or legislative action.
The problem of notice also has dogged resolution of future claims:
simply stated, how can unknown and unidentified future claimants
have notice of the resolution of their claims? Even more problematic,
how can any court approve a settlement of future claims, consistent
with due process, without adequate notice to future claimants?" It
37 See supra note 1 (discussing the problems attending mass tort litigation).
m See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1446-56 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (concluding that "exposure to a toxic substance constitutes sufficient injury in
fact to give plaintiff standing to sue in federal court").
39 See supra note 19 (citing numerous sources discussing the Article I case and
controversy objection). The petitioners in Amchem and Ortiz raised these Article I
arguments; however, the Supreme Court did not address the Article mI issues in either
decision. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, 44-45, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999) (No. 97-1704) (making Article III arguments); Brief for
Petitioner at 7-8, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (No. 96-270)
(raising an Article IH issue); see also Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2307 (declining to address the
issue); Amnhem, 521 U.S. at 612-13 (same).
40 Plaintiff and defense attorneys, at least, know future claims when they see them.
4' Issues around notice were raised in both the Amchem and Ortiz appeals, but the
Supreme Court also left these issues unresolved. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, Amehem,
(No. 96-270) (raising the notice issue); Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, Ortiz, (No. 97-
1704) (same); Oakiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312 n.19 ("Since satisfaction or not of a notice
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becomes clear from these queries that resolution of future claims must
in some way deal with notice.
Finally, any resolution of future tort claims must be based on
consent. Constitutional due process requires no less.
C. Implementing Private Future Claims Processing
The idea for privatizing the resolution of future claims is simple.
It is based on three fundamental propositions: (1) that future claims
in latent mass tort litigation can be resolved in a manner that is fair
and consistent with due process; (2) that parties in the present
litigation and the judiciary are not the best actors to resolve future
claims property, because among other reasons they lack incentives to
do so; and (3) that economic incentives will encourage private vendors
to efficiently, expeditiously, and fairly resolve future claims. Here is
how privatization would work: First, any mass tort litigation filed in
federal court would be subject, under local rules or CJ.R.A. (Civil
Justice Reform Act) plans, to complex case tracking.4 Mass tort
litigation involving latent injury claims immediately would be sent to a
judge.
Second, the judge would ascertain, from the pleadings and in
conference with the parties, whether the litigation involved a latent
injury mass tort. If so, the judge would exercise power, under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to sever the future claims from the
litigation.44
Third, the judge would meet and confer with the parties regarding
the remainder of the litigation,4 which would consist of current claims
requirement would not effect the disposition of this case, we express no opinion on the
need for notice . . . in this case."); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("Because we have
concluded that the class in this case cannot satisfy the requirements of common issue
predominance and adequacy of representation, we need not rule... on the notice
given here.").
4 SeeJudicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 471-73, 104 Star.
5089, 5090-93. All 94 federal district courts now have CJ.R.A. plans in effect.
Complex case tracking is also sometimes called "differential case tracking." Many
federal district courts currently have differential case management rules in place either
as a matter of local rulemaking, or as a consequence of implementing the 1990 Civil
Justice Reform Act. See e.g., U.S. DIST. Cr., M.D. ALA., Civ. J. ExPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCION PLAN at II ("Differentiated Case Management"); U.S. DIST. Cr. D.C., L.
CIV. R. 16.4 (assigning all civil actions to either a "fast track," "standard track," or
"complex track").
" See FD. R. CrV. P. 42(b) (empowering courts to order separate trial of claims or
issues).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (empowering courts to direct pretrial conferences).
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only. The plaintiffs and defendants could proceed to trial or negotiate
a settlement, but the parties would deal only with current claimants.
Fourth, the judge-under a local rule authorizing such referral-
would refer the future claims to "future claims vendors"46 for a bidding
process. The court would appoint a guardian or other fiduciary for
the future claimants and maintain continuing jurisdiction over the
future claims. The court would pre-screen and approve future claims
vendors. These vendors would have to demonstrate sufficient
capitalization and expertise in administering future claims funds.
Vendors could demonstrate adequate capitalization through multiple
mass tort funds, thereby spreading risk among pooled assets.
Fifth, the interested future claims vendors would prepare and
submit bids to the defendant for administering future claims involved
in the latent injury mass tort. This bid would include a guaranteed
payment to the claimant, based on current values for like claims
resolved in the tort system, and adjusted for the time value of money
(or inflation or escalation). The bid also would include the vendor's
estimate of the number of claims, administration expenses, and profit.
The bid would include details relating to claims administration,
including mechanisms for providing notice, proof of claims, and pay-
outs.
Sixth, the defendant could accept or reject any bid from a future
claims vendor.
Seventh, the defendant and the vendor would present their
agreement to the court for approval. The guardian or fiduciary for
the future claimants would present an independent report to the court
concerning the substantive and procedural sufficiency of the bid. The
court would assess the agreement for substantive and procedural
sufficiency. Consent of future claimants to a fair, court-approved
future claims fund would be implied.
Finally, when the defendant has accepted and the court has
approved a vendor's bid, the defendant would deposit the agreed fund
and be relieved of any further obligation to future claimants. Future
claimants could not sue the defendant in the tort system but rather
would be referred to the vendor. The future claims vendor would
administer claims under the terms of the agreement.
46 Some federal courts, by local rule or under the authority of CJ.R.A. plans,
authorize referral of cases to alternative dispute resolution vendors. See S.D. T.
LOCALR. 20B (allowing the district court to "refer a case toADR," and authorizing the
court to choose an Alternative Dispute Resolution provider if the court believes an
ADR provider is suitable for the case).
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IV. BENEFITS AND FEASIBnITiY
Who would benefit from privatizing future claims resolution, and
why would privatization work?
The privatization of future claims resolution would work because it
would call into existence commercial vendors with an economic
incentive to maximize profit by accurately estimating the universe of
future claimants and by minimizing transaction costs in administering
claims. Any vendor with bad business judgment would fail; no such
vendor would ever gain court approval as a listed vendor for referral.
Future claimants would benefit because they would be guaranteed
compensation for valid claims, benchmarked by recoveries for similar
current claims in the tort system. No future claimant, upon the proof
of a claim, would receive less value than any current claimant, adjusted
for the time value of money. In addition, future claimants might
actually recover a higher percentage of their claim's value because
privatization would serve to eliminate the high transaction costs
endemic to mass tort recoveries, particularly attorneys' fees.
Defendants benefit in four ways. First, defendants would achieve
global peace. Second, defendants benefit by a competitive bidding
system to establish the size of the fund. Hence, competitive vendors
will have to make very accurate estimates of the number of future
claimants, the value of those claims, and the total amount of the fund
necessary to pay those claims. They also have to accurately estimate a
reasonable profit margin for the award of the contract. Third,
defendants benefit by paying out a fund calculated by economic actors
with an interest in reducing high transaction costs. Finally, defendants
benefit by getting out of the future claims administration business.
Future claims vendors-a new business venture that would come
into existence under this proposal--will benefit by being able to bid
competitively for the business of administering future claims, and by
making a profit from this enterprise. Under this system, future claims
vendors would be penalized only to the extent that they made poor
business judgments in estimating the number of future claims or in
administering the claims payments.
The judicial system will also benefit. This proposal accomplishes
the three values of Rule 1: to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
17 While vendors may be able to discharge their obligations by declaring bankruptcy
under this proposal, this would not appear to pose a significant risk for future
claimants. The proposal's provision for strong judicial oversight, as well as the "repeat-
player" factor, would effectively constrain this problem.
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resolution of disputes. In addition, the judicial system benefits by
unpacking the resolution of future claims from the resolution of
current claims and by maintaining continuing supervisory jurisdiction
over future claims to ensure the legal sufficiency of the vendor
agreement.
Finally, plaintiffs' lawyers benefit by being able to litigate or settle
present claims, unimpaired by conflict of interest and collusion
problems inherent in simultaneously representing future claimants.
Plaintiffs' lawyers can sue or settle for the full current value of such
claims and take full attorneys' fees.
CONCLUSION
This is, of course, a semi-shocking proposal, but no more shocking
than Geoffrey Hazard's federalized product liability-insurance-
workmen's compensation statute. Nor is it more shocking than
stretching the limited-fund class action, doing an end-run around the
bankruptcy laws, or massaging the interpleader rule.
This proposal would solve a host of problems. It cuts the head off
the beast: it severs the future claims from the current claims. This
ought to deal with Amchem and Ortiz issues.
This proposal lets plaintiffs' lawyers take their fees for current
claims-in whatever fashion they choose to resolve them-but it does
not let plaintiffs' lawyers get greedy and use future claims as a
negotiating chip to inflate gross settlement values and attorneys' fees.
This proposal provides an administrative means to compensate
future claimants with recoveries superior to those available in the tort
system, reducing transaction costs and attorneys fees.
This proposal solves the defendants' problem of perpetual
litigation.
This proposal largely takes the judicial system out of the loop, with
the exception of the limited supervisory role of approving a vendor's
bid for the future claims business.
Finally, this proposal has the advantage that it does not require the
passage of much new legislation, modification of existing rules, or
interpretation of Rule 23 in ways that Justice Souter would not
approve.
In almost every respect, existing federal and local rules could
implement this proposal. The major innovation would be court
approval of future claims vendors. Many federal courts already
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approve ADR vendors, however, so there is already significant judicial
expertise in this area.
CODA
We were encouraged to come to this symposium with new ideas.
The futures problem is the nub of latent-injury mass tort litigation.
Either we can think and talk about new ideas, or, as Professor Hazard
concludes (and I gloomily second), we can soldier on with the present
law of torts and procedure, and we probably will do so.
